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Federal Jurisdiction-An Apparent Expansion of the Scope of Military
Habeas Corpus Review
The scope of review by a federal district court in a habeas corpus1
proceeding is particularly important,2 since by means of the writ a single
federal judge can overturn the results of the most considered and rea-
soned opinions of entire court systems.3 It would seem that any area of
the law so fraught with inherent impact, frictions, and opportunities for
judicial inefficiency should be characterized by clear principles. How-
ever, while the scope of review is reasonably well defined with respect to
petitions for writs of habeas corpus by state4 and non-military federal5
prisoners, the federal district court judge faces extreme confusion and
sparse guidance when the petitioner happens to be in confinement as a
result of a military court-martial.6 In Allen v. VanCantfort7 the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit appears to have expanded significantly
the scope of review available to the military prisoner and thus the oppor-
tunities for abuse of the writ without clarifying substantially the control-
ling principles.
On September 9, 1968, Allen, then a Marine lance corporal,
pleaded guilty to five specifications of premeditated murder in a general
court-martial convened at Da Nang, South Vietnam. After exhausting
all available military remedies, Allen petitioned the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maine for a writ of habeas corpus.8 The
'28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970) provide the statutory framework within which federal courts
entertain collateral attacks on the confinement of state, federal non-military, and military prisoners.
2The Supreme Court has stated that the history of the writ of habeas corpus "is inextricably
intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
401 (1963). See also Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 101-25 (1959);
Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact Finding
Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 897-906 (1966).
3Good discussions of this problem appear in Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State
Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus:
Postcon viction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960).
'Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1970). See Wright & Sofaer, supra note 2, at 895.
5See, e.g., Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970); Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, andSection 2255:A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1964).
'Katz & Nelson, The Need for Clarification in Military Habeas Corpus, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 193,
194 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Katz & Nelson].
7436 F.2d 625 (Ist Cir. 1971).
11d. at 628. As a general rule the prisoner must unsuccessfully pursue all statutorily provided
direct attacks on his confinement before he will be allowed to attack it collaterally. Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953). Two previous habeas corpus petitions had been dismissed for failure to exhaust
all available military remedies.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
district court denied the writ by following the apparent rationale of
Supreme Court precedent and limiting its inquiry to whether the military
courts system had given full and fair consideration to the constitutional
claims of the petitioner? Although the First Circuit affirmed the denial
of the petition, it not only reviewed the constitutional issues on the merits
but also held that it could and must review allegations of statutory error
committed during the trial. The court's resolution of the statutory-error
issue marks a drastic expansion of the scope of review which is best
appreciated with the benefit of historical perspective.
In 1858 the Supreme Court held that civil courts have no inherent
power to interfere with courts-martial decisions.'" Because of the exigen-
cies of military life and the unique ability of the military courts to
determine their disciplinary standards, the Court treated the military
courts as an autonomous and separate system of jurisprudence. The
bases for this position are article I of the Constitution, which gives
Congress the power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces," and article II, which provides that the
President shall be commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Thus the
military courts were and are considered agencies of the executive
branch." The one exception to the hands-off policy was the exercise of
the habeas corpus jurisdiction of federal courts,12 although as a result
of the general reluctance of civil courts to review military decisions the
scope of review was very limited. 13 Originally inquiry was confined to
whether the military court had jurisdiction over the person concerned
and the subject matter of the case." Expansion soon followed when
federal civil courts inquired whether the military court had exceeded its
'Allen v. VanCantfort, 316 F. Supp. 222 (D. Maine 1970).
1"Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 243 (1864); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
65 (1858).
"By contrast, the federal civil judiciary, for example, has its roots in U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 1.
'
2Exparte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879). The Supreme Court had previously considered the subject
of military habeas corpus in the case of persons imprisoned by a military commission. Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). However, Reed was the first case in which the petitioner was
detained as a result of a court-martial conviction. See W. AYCOCK & S. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 325 n.40 (1955) [hereinafter cited as AYCOCK &
WURFEL].
'
3Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial
Convictions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 40, 43 (1961); Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determina.
tions and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REv. 483, 488 (1969).
"Exparte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879). See generally AYCOCK & WURFEL 314-29.
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power in the imposition of the sentence, 15 but this examination was still
characterized as "jurisdictional."
The first real crack in this armor of autonomy occurred in 1947
when the Court of Claims followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in Johnson v. Zerbst6 and held that military courts having jurisdiction
at the outset may lose that jurisdiction if they deprive the accused of
constitutional rights during the course of the trial. 7 However, this ex-
pansion of the review by civil courts of military court decisions was soon
undermined by the Supreme Court in Hiatt v. Brown:'5 "It is well settled
that 'by habeas corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correct-
ing power over the proceedings of a court-martial . . . The single
inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.' "19 After Hiatt was decided the scope
of federal habeas corpus review of state-court decisions, which
previously had paralleled the development of military habeas corpus,
was expanded substantially. 20 This was the situation when the Supreme
Court decided the landmark case of Burns v. Wilson21 in 1953. Chief
Justice Vinson, speaking for a plurality, said:
These records make it plain that the military courts have heard
petitioners out on every significant [constitutional] allegation ....
[A]ccordingly it is not the duty of the civil courts simply to repeat the
process . . . It is the limited function of the civil courts to determine
whether the military have [sic] given fair consideration to each of these
claims.2
Burns is generally thought to stand for the proposition that the civil
courts should not consider the constitutional contentions of a military
petitioner that have been dealt with "fully and fairly" by the military
tribunal.2 3 This expansion of the previous narrow jurisdictional inquiry
IsCarter v. McClaughery, 183 U.S. 365 (1902).
16304 U.S. 458 (1938).
"Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. CI. 1947). The apparent, temporary expansion
of military habeas corpus is considered in Katz & Nelson 200-02.
"8339 U.S. 103 (1950).
'OId. at I1.
2°See generally Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in
Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy
for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. Rv. 461 (1960).
21346 U.S. 137 (1953).
22d. at 144.
"Some courts have stated that once the military tribunal has given fair consideration to the
petitioner's constitutional contentions, the other federal courts cannot re-examine them. E.g., Ken-
nedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967); Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1961);
1971]
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has been rejected by one authority who states that even after Burns "the
record of the Supreme Court of never having sanctioned the granting of
a writ of habeas corpus in a military case on due process, as distin-
guished from jurisdictional grounds, remains intact."24 Subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions have failed to clarify the Burns test; consequently,
the lower courts have used varied approaches to its application in the
cases in which the petitioner alleges a denial of a constitutional right,2j
and at least one court has applied the Burns test to all the petitioner's
contentions, not just those of a constitutional dimension.2"
The First Circuit in Allen, after referring to the confusion surround-
ing the Burns decision, treated the constitutional issues in the same
manner as an increasing number of federal civil courts have done. z2 That
is, the court reviewed the merits of the petitioner's constitutional claims
and determined that since they were insufficiently supported by the re-
cord and had been thoroughly considered by the military reviewing au-
thorities, the petition should be dismissed without deciding the scope of
review of the constitutional issues. 28 Taking this reasoning full circle, a
court finding support for the petitioner's allegations after a brief review
on the merits would then have to go back and determine if this finding
were within the permissible scope of review. Such a procedure is awk-
ward at best.
However, the crucial and significant aspect of Allen is not the
circumvention of the issue of the scope of review of alleged constitutional
errors; it is, rather, the court's holding that federal civil courts have the
power to and must review a military prisoner's allegations of statutory
error committed by the military tribunal. The specific error alleged in
Allen was that the petitioner's guilty plea had been accepted in violation
of a clear Uniform Code of Military Justice mandate that it not be
Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1955). Other courts have reviewed the issues of constitu-
tional law de novo by either ignoring or bypassing Burns. See, e.g., Burns v. Harris, 340 F.2d 383
(8th Cir. 1965); Fischer v. Ruffner, 277 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1960); White v. Humphrey, 212 F.2d
503 (3d Cir. 1954). At least one lower court has implied that a determination of the fairness of
consideration by the military court necessarily involves an inquiry into the correctness of its deci-
sion. Sweet v. Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456,458 (D. Kan. 1959).
24AYCOCK & WURFEL 371.
"See, e.g., cases cited note 23 supra.
26Bourchier v. Van Metre, 223 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
"E.g., Swisher v. United States, 354 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1966); Kasey v. Goodwyn, 291 F.2d
174 (4th Cir. 1961). See also Katz & Nelson 206-1I.
2436 F.2d at 628-29.
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accepted.29 In holding that review of the alleged statutory error was
required, the court concerned itself only with the language of the applica-
ble habeas corpus statute, which provides that "[t]he writ of habeas
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless .. . [h]e is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States," 3 and
stated: "Given this language, we cannot refuse to consider all alleged
errors of law committed by the military without explicit authority for
doing so."' 31 The court avoided the Burns full-and-fair-consideration test
for this procedural question by interpreting Burns as being limited to
questions of a constitutional magnitude. Even assuming such a limita-
tion on Burns, it is nonetheless a questionable interpretation of the fed-
eral habeas corpus statute that would require the court to consider al-
leged procedural defects unless explicit authority exists for not doing so;
the language of the statute merely prohibits granting the writ if the
petitioner is not confined in violation of the "laws" and does not affir-
matively require his release if he is so confined.32
The First Circuit's interpretation of the habeas corpus statute effec-
tively grants the military prisoner a virtual trial de novo in the federal
court when he merely alleges departures from the statutorily prescribed
pretrial procedure to be followed by the convening authority or the
court-martial. Thus an entirely new area of review is opened at a time
when the federal courts are striving to find a solution to the almost
overwhelming flood of habeas corpus petitions of recent years.3 Mo-
reover, apparently Allen would require a district court to consider a
petitioner's allegations of violations of procedural statutes notwith-
standing exhaustive, fair review of the same alleged errors by the military
courts, and still the district court could refuse to consider the petitioner's
more serious, constitutional allegations by resort to the Burns full-and-
fair-consideration language.
The priority of a petitioner's constitutional allegations is well set-
tled when the petitioner is a state prisoner. The court may not review
alleged procedural or statutory error unless there is a substantial allega-
tion of a denial of a constitutional right.3 When the petitioner is a non-
-See 10 U.S.C. § 845(b) (1970).
-28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
3436 F.2d at 629.
-28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3) (1970).
'AC. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 217 (2d ed. 1970).
3'See authorities cited note 4 supra.
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military federal prisoner, his constitutional claims still receive priority
even though the pertinent habeas corpus statute provides that the peti-
tion may be granted if the petitioner is held "in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws . . . of the United States. ' 35 In cases involving non-military
federal prisoners, the courts have considered the legislative history of the
statute and have determined that the term "laws" is to be construed
narrowly and that relief will not be granted in every case where the
prisoner is held in violation of the federal laws.3" Thus the Allen re-
sult-a great expansion of the power of federal courts to review allega-
"tions by military prisoners of statutory error and an apparent retention
of the relatively narrow scope of review of their constitutional allega-
tions-is contrary to the history of the development of the writ and is in
marked contrast to the scope and priorities of review of'petitions by state
and non-military federal prisoners.
Although Allen clarifies the scope of review of statutory error-by
holding that all such errors are to be reviewed-and thus contributes to
certainty in this area of the law, the decision will precipitate a barrage
of issues respecting the manner in which such review is to be carried out
and the relief to be afforded. For example, when the statutory correct-
ness of a pre-trial procedure turns on disputed facts, the court must
either accept the government's version of the history of events or resolve
the factual dispute de novo as is done with respect to facts upon which
the constitutional rights of state prisoners depend. And, of course, there
is the possibility of treating some statutory errors as "harmless"-but
which ones?37 Furthermore, as a practical matter, the government won
the case but lost the issue. How is the government to appeal expansion
of the scope of review of habeas corpus if the reviewing court requires
the government to engage in a factual dispute and then denies the writ?
Allen typifies the hopeless situation in which the lower federal courts
find themselves; their attempts to settle habeas corpus issues seem to
result only in the geometric multiplication of issues. That fact and
Allen's distortion of the priorities of review make it imperative that the
Supreme Court take the first opportunity to clarify its guidelines and
restore symmetry in the area of military habeas corpus.3"
TIMOTHY J. SIMMONS
-28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970).
uHill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
7FED. R. CRIM. P. 52.
38See, e.g., Katz & Nelson.
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